Presentation Type
Oral/Paper Presentation
Abstract
The ‘No Best World’ argument is often used as an objection to the possibility of perfect moral goodness. This paper will seek to undermine the ‘No Best World’ argument in three ways: (1) with a certain understanding of what makes a world ‘morally best,’ there is a best world; (2) if the argument for our world being the uniquely best world is not compelling, at the very least, there are no better worlds than ours; and (3) God could have had reasons for creating a world that are not based on the objective moral value. I will first define key terms, outline the 'No Best World' argument, and discuss its implications if successful. Next, I will examine a framework for objecting to the argument based on the views of Leibniz, Climenhaga, and Raz, alongside counterarguments primarily from Rowe and Wielenberg. Finally, I will conclude that even if the created world is morally surpassable, this does not negate the possibility of perfect moral goodness.
Faculty Mentor
Dr. Caleb Clanton
Recommended Citation
Tucker, Hudson, "The ‘No Best World’ Argument: A Strong Or Weak Objection to the Possibility of Perfect Goodness?" (2025). Student Scholar Symposium. 185.
https://digitalcollections.lipscomb.edu/student_scholars_symposium/2025/Full_schedule/185
The ‘No Best World’ Argument: A Strong Or Weak Objection to the Possibility of Perfect Goodness?
The ‘No Best World’ argument is often used as an objection to the possibility of perfect moral goodness. This paper will seek to undermine the ‘No Best World’ argument in three ways: (1) with a certain understanding of what makes a world ‘morally best,’ there is a best world; (2) if the argument for our world being the uniquely best world is not compelling, at the very least, there are no better worlds than ours; and (3) God could have had reasons for creating a world that are not based on the objective moral value. I will first define key terms, outline the 'No Best World' argument, and discuss its implications if successful. Next, I will examine a framework for objecting to the argument based on the views of Leibniz, Climenhaga, and Raz, alongside counterarguments primarily from Rowe and Wielenberg. Finally, I will conclude that even if the created world is morally surpassable, this does not negate the possibility of perfect moral goodness.